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Democratic Theory When 
Democracy Is Fugitive
Ali Aslam, David McIvor, and Joel Alden Schlosser
	 Abstract: Urgent alarms now warn of the erosion of democratic norms 
and the decline of democratic institutions. These antidemocratic trends 
have prompted some democratic theorists to reject the seeming inevitability 
of democratic forms of government and instead to consider democracy as 
a fugitive phenomenon. Fugitive democracy, as we argue below, is a theory 
composed of two parts. F irst, it includes a robust, normative ideal of democ-
racy and, second, a clear-eyed vision of the historical defeats and generic 
difficulties attendant to that ideal. This article considers how democratic 
theorists might respond to the challenges posed by fugitive democracy and 
the implications of such an understanding for future research in democratic 
theory.
	 Keywords: democracy, fugitivity, Hannah Arendt, Sheldon Wolin, social 
movements
After the end of the end of history, after the intoxicating claims of demo-
cratic inevitability have morphed into painful hangovers, and after the 
successive democratic waves have broken and receded from the shore, 
perhaps democratic theory is ready to face squarely the possibility that 
its subject of concern is less stable, predictable, and potent as was so re-
cently assumed. Democratic theorists and political scientists have raised 
increasingly urgent alarm bells about the global state of democracy in 
recent years (e.g., Bartels 2015; Brown 2015; Connolly 2018; Gilens and 
Page 2014; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018; Runciman 2018; Snyder 
2018; Wolin 2008), especially in the face of illiberal trends and authori-
tarian retrenchments (Zakaria 2007). In established democratic countries 
democratic norms have eroded and democratic institutions have become 
sclerotic and unresponsive (Lee and McCarty 2019). Modern constitutional 
state-centered democracy, in the words of the democratic theorist Larry 
Bartels, is in a global “recession” (2015).
Taken together, these antidemocratic trends have undermined 
assumptions that democratic transitions are somehow inevitable or 
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immune to reversal. However, they have not yet shaken a deeper assump-
tion about the nature of democracy and, hence, the responsibilities of 
democratic theory. Namely, theorists of both democracy’s rise and de-
cline largely accept a limited or truncated version of democracy associ-
ated with liberal norms and minimalist participatory institutions (Bartels 
2008; Dahl 2000; Schattschneider 1975). Democracy is identified with – or 
defined down to – competitive elections, representative institutions, the 
party system, and constitutional protections. And while these protections 
provide important space for democratic, participatory processes and 
practices, they do not reach very deeply into contemporary mass societ-
ies and, because of this, are continually threatened by an overall decline 
in democratic aspirations, affects, and ideals. Moreover – and more in-
sidiously – the protections provided by the constitutional state itself can 
serve to truncate democratic imagination and innovation.
However, perhaps it is an opportune moment to rethink the nature of 
democracy itself and, thereby, to rethink the role of the democratic the-
orist. In particular, we argue below that democracy be reconceptualized 
as a “fugitive” experience or moment. Beginning with the work of Shel-
don Wolin and Hannah Arendt, we state the central premises of fugitive 
democracy (Section I) before exploring the nuanced uses of fugitivity in 
contemporary political theory (Section II) and the implications that these 
uses have for democratic theory (Section III). Fugitive democracy can be 
a valuable starting point for democratic theory because it both identifies 
a robust normative standard for democracy while simultaneously point-
ing to obstacles for its realization. Moreover, the nuances of fugitivity 
position the concept between an orientation toward democratic renewal 
and desires for flight and refusal. Exploring the nuances of fugitivity can 
reconfigure the research agenda for democratic theory in four specific 
ways: by (1) challenging the existing idea of the democratic subject, (2) 
linking contemporary democratic theory to post- and anti-colonial the-
orists, (3) emphasizing the heterogeneity within the very concept of the 
“demos,” and (4) orienting democratic theory less toward descriptive ac-
counts of democracy and more toward experimental visions and method-
ologies aimed at re-generating democracy.
Two Fugitive Voices in Contemporary Democratic Theory: 
Wolin and Arendt
The declining efficacy of democratic institutions and norms in recent 
years has, once again, elicited repeated bouts of alarmism. Yet these ac-
counts, despite some variance in their anxieties, each share a common 
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presumption – namely, that democracy is a known entity, composed of a 
specific set of institutions, practices, norms, and commonly held beliefs 
(Diamond 2008). Or, to use another common metaphor, democracy is a 
public creature animated by constitutional and institutional forces. After 
all, democracy can only die if it once lived, democratic liberty can be 
endangered only if it was once protected, and democratic norms can only 
be threatened if they were somewhere normal and broadly normative.
The idea of democracy as a “fugitive” phenomenon draws different 
conclusions about the state of democracy because it begins from radi-
cally different presuppositions. For instance, Sheldon Wolin has argued 
that democracy ought to be reconceptualized as “something other than a 
form of government” (1994a: 23; 1994b: 30). Democracy, for Wolin, is best 
viewed as a “rebellious moment” through which people temporarily ob-
tain a “political mode of existence” by virtue of their participation in pub-
lic deliberations and decision making (1994a: 23–24). Democracy, then, “is 
not about where the political is located but how it is experienced” (1994a: 
18). By this measure, institutionalization can mark the attenuation of de-
mocracy as much as its realization. With institutions comes the devel-
opment of hierarchies, organized interests, and a reliance on technical 
expertise, which serve to sublimate demands for broader participation 
into virtues of “loyalty, obedience, and law-abidingness” (1994a: 13). For 
Wolin, then, the democratization already assumed by theorists of democ-
racy’s decline was little more than the organized process by which the 
“labor, wealth, and psyches of citizens” have been extracted, exploited, or 
distracted (1994a: 13). In other words, democracy is about the possibility 
of political experience – the expression of power (kratos) by the people 
(demos) – and institutions typically serve to foreclose opportunities for the 
expansion and generalization of this experience (Ober 2017).
Democracy is fugitive because of external and internal obstacles to 
its realization. Externally, elites jockey to contain, control, manipulate, 
or dissipate popular energies for political participation. Internally, demo-
cratic moments are threatened by the heterogeneity that results from 
human freedom. The capacity to participate in solidaristic moments of 
political experience necessarily indicates the possibility of refusing such 
participation – “Yes, we can” is shadowed always by “I’d prefer not to.” Fu-
gitive democratic moments, in which political experience and practices 
are reconstituted, thereby form a discontinuous tradition ranging from 
the abolitionist movement to the populist and agrarian revolts of the 
nineteenth century to the civil rights movement of the twentieth century 
and to countless other efforts large and small to wrest some semblance 
of democratic control over public life. Fugitive democratic moments can 
appear at any time, even if such appearances are by definition against 
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the odds. By this account, democracy is less stable, settled, or predictable 
than many theorists assume, and in fact the aspiration toward a settled 
form for democracy is among the threats to its continual regeneration.
Wolin’s emphasis on democracy as a fugitive experience echoes the 
ideas of Hannah Arendt, who similarly argued that moments of collective 
action are both historically rare and increasingly threatened in an age of 
organization. For Arendt, popular bodies of direct government spring up 
“spontaneously” when existing institutions fail or are swept away. This 
revolutionary “tradition,” however – like Wolin’s account of fugitive de-
mocracy  – does not form a continuous whole (Arendt [1963] 1990). In-
stead, moments in which the political is experienced reflect “a stubborn, 
persistent reminder of how, when circumstances were propitious, men 
and women could create the spaces of freedom” (Baehr 2000: xlii). Im-
portantly, Arendt links action directly to freedom; as she puts it, “to be 
free and to act are the same thing” (Arendt [1961] 2006: 152), and action 
in turn implies both equality and plurality (Arendt [1958] 1998). Similar 
to Wolin, then, Arendt rejects the liberal democratic presumption that 
equality and liberty are in tension with one another, along with the idea 
that institutionalization or centralization are necessary elements of the 
attainment or preservation of political experience.
Both Wolin and Arendt have been criticized for their stark – if not 
romantic – theories of democracy and the political. Fugitive or “council” 
democracy seems to protect a pure or pristine version of democracy from 
the supposedly sullying forces of institutionalization and organization 
(McIvor 2016b). However, both Wolin and Arendt see the outcast nature 
of political experience as a regrettable and even tragic outcome; “coun-
cil” democracy represents a “lost treasure,” in the words of Arendt, and 
Wolin has called fugitivity the great “trouble” with democracy (Arendt 
[1963] 1990; Hedges and Wolin 2014). Nevertheless, for either theorist to 
accept institutionalist or representative accounts of democracy would 
be to forsake the core of the democratic experience – namely, the de-
sire for participation in the activities of freedom: expression, discussion, 
and decision on matters of public or common concern. In other words, 
fugitive democracy is not an ideal as such; instead, it is the light cast 
by repeated historical failures and the generic difficulties that attend the 
ideal of democracy. Fugitive democracy holds fast to the promise of de-
mocracy – namely, that power can be both mutually inclusive and widely 
shared – and as such it provides witness to the ways in which this ideal 
has been compromised, lost, suppressed, or bargained away.
By the light of mainstream democratic theory, the account of fu-
gitive democracy may seem anachronistic and unrealistic, a version of 
Benjamin Constant’s “liberty of the ancients” as opposed to the “liberty 
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of the moderns” ([1819] 1988). However, by the diminishing light of con-
temporary liberal democracy, fugitive democracy may be an idea whose 
time has come. Fugitive democracy lays out a clear understanding of de-
mocracy – political experience, obtained through moments of solidaristic 
collective action – that looks less like the liberties of the ancients than 
the embodiment of an ancient desire for liberty, as germane to our era 
as to any other. For Arendt, demands for participation in the activities 
of freedom reflect the principle of natality ([1958] 1998). For Wolin, how-
ever, fugitive democracy speaks to the capacity for political “renewal,” 
the “simple fact” that “ordinary individuals are capable of creating new 
cultural patterns of commonality at any moment” (Wolin 1994a: 24).
The idea of fugitive democracy might serve to reconfigure the re-
search agenda for democratic theorists, but Wolin’s “simple fact” is far 
from simple in an age of democratic decline, pessimism, and impasse. In 
the next section we develop a more nuanced understanding of fugitive 
democracy as being positioned between renewal and flight.
Fugitive Democracy
Wolin and Arendt articulate the fugitive strand in democratic theory; re-
cent decolonial work on fugitivity illuminates new pathways for democ-
ratizing fugitivity. A significant contribution of postcolonial theory to 
democratic theory has been to highlight the violent histories of enslave-
ment and settler colonialism and to reveal how the rhetoric and ideals of 
democracy have often been pretexts or justifications for domination, not 
freedom or equality. Moreover, colonial legacies still inform the logics of 
political practice and of political theory. Fugitive democracy, as we see 
it, has to learn from and lean upon the critiques of anticolonial theorists 
while simultaneously refusing to forsake the ideal of democracy.
Fugitive democracy, then, requires an awareness of the ways in which 
values inherent to the pursuit of democracy have served as weapons of 
domination as much as tools of liberation. For instance, as Glen Sean 
Coulthard has argued, the politics of recognition – which has proliferated 
in liberal democratic regimes as means of addressing the challenges of 
pluralism – recenters the state authorities responsible for violent extermi-
nation or assimilation of indigenous subjects in settler-states (Coulthard 
2014). From the perspective of this history and the present-day marginal-
ization of indigenous persons and communities, Coulthard argues that 
the assumed equality underlying the reciprocity of recognition exists in 
name only. For Coulthard, the best mode of response to histories of mar-
ginalization and oppression is a resurgent politics of recognition that sets 
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itself defiantly against settler colonial states and focuses on building up 
resources and resilience within indigenous communities.
For many theorists, then, there is deep distrust of the language of 
democracy, as it has so often functioned as a Trojan horse presented as 
a benevolent gift only to reveal itself as a front for destruction. For good 
reason, modern state-centered constitutional democracy has sent people 
running (cf. Tully 1995). As a result, political theorists have begun increas-
ingly to theorize from the perspective of those who have been excluded 
from both democratic regimes and democratic imaginaries. For example, 
Neil Roberts has recently argued for a concept of freedom as “marron-
age” or escape (2015). He has argued that the experience of slaves – who 
understood freedom as “flight” – have largely been ignored by the tradi-
tion of democratic theory, which has in large part taken its conception of 
freedom from the experience of slave owners. As Roberts demonstrates, 
fugitivity for escaping slaves was primarily understood spatially: flight 
away from the plantation, as membership in a semiautonomous “ma-
roon” community of free and run-away Blacks, or in the desires for inde-
pendent homelands articulated by Marcus Garvey and others. This spatial 
concept of fugitivity reflects a key difference from Wolin’s description of 
fugitive democracy, which he describes as episodic moments when citi-
zens rediscover or forge common concerns. Wolin’s language is infused 
with metaphors of settlement and even of agriculture. The politics of 
what he calls “tending” involves mutual care and attentiveness that he 
distinguishes from the “intending politics” of the managerial state (1989: 
82–99). However, Wolin’s uncritical use of agricultural metaphors reflects 
a broader silence in his work on the questions of settler colonialism and 
white supremacy. When Wolin claims that fugitive democracy represents 
a source of democratic renewal, he is more accurately referring to the set-
tler democracy observed by Tocqueville, which was predicated on struc-
tural exclusions and racialized violence.
A third example of fugitivity that opposes democracy – and politics 
more generally – comes with the work of Fred Moten and Stefano Harney. 
Moten’s refusal of “politics” in favor of what he calls “Black sociality” is 
motivated by his belief that in both theory and practice the history of 
Western political development has been anti-Black; for this reason, he 
asserts, this history is irreparable (2017, 2018a, 2018b). Instead of a demo-
cratic politics of repair for the living legacies of anti-Blackness, Moten 
argues for interstitial zones of refuge and lines of flight away from these 
sources of harm through the recognition of an already-existing abundance 
of creativity and sociality among Black communities. These “undercom-
mons” (Harney and Moten 2017) or zones of Black sociality are constituted 
through practices of mutual care and assembly that contrast with the 
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possessive individualism at the center of a liberal-capitalist order that de-
values Black life. Moten refuses politics without apology in order to keep 
politics from contaminating sociality. As Moten and Harney write, “We 
are anti-politically romantic about existing social life. We aren’t responsi-
ble for politics” (2017: 20).
The long silence within democratic theory on the achievement of 
democratic freedom through practices of domination explains why many 
theorists reject the language of democracy and why they see fugitivity in 
terms of flight, resistance, or refuge. Theorists conceive of fugitivity either 
temporally or spatially, depending on whether they believe that modern 
state-centered democracies were ever genuinely democratic in the sense 
that diverse citizens could come together for common purposes to ex-
ercise power together. This assessment usually splits on the question of 
whether theorists acknowledge the origins of modern democratic states 
as settler societies. For those who do not, fugitive democratic actions can 
renew or revitalize the democratic core of those societies by expanding 
the polity to include those groups previously denied full citizenship and 
rights. Theorists who conceive of fugitivity temporally remain committed 
to democracy as an aspiration within established states, while those who 
theorize fugitivity in spatial terms prioritize flight and escape because 
they are wary of an injurious history overseen by those states that pre-
dates and continues beyond the point when recognition was extended to 
dominated populations.
The fugitivity of Coulthard, Roberts, and Moten calls into question 
who is a political subject and what political subjectivity looks like. Yet 
even explicitly antipolitical flight like Moten’s has implications for the-
orizing democracy. For instance, Lia Haro and Romand Coles argue that 
the practices of communities along the route of the Underground Rail-
road show how fugitivity is simultaneously a flight from danger and a 
movement toward new possibilities (Haro and Coles forthcoming). Sur-
veying the history of these communities, Haro and Coles bridge the split 
between spatial and temporal conceptions of fugitivity by making stra-
tegic use of refuge to mobilize the kind of grassroots efforts that Wolin 
sees as a source of renewal. The sanctuary communities that Haro and 
Coles examine are also examples of a spatial fugitivity or sociality – lines 
of flight leading to independent, free Black communities – that Moten 
draws upon, but here they seek out and are dependent upon broader 
forms of association that represent a transformative democratic politics 
aiming to reconstitute the polity rather than simply refusing it or sur-
viving in its shadows. By narrating the histories of these communities, 
Haro and Coles practice democratic theory by the light of fugitivity. Such 
accounts testify to and call into being desires for experiences of collective 
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belonging sometimes glimpsed in flight, in moments of democratic re-
newal, and occasionally in events that singularly fuse the spatial and tem-
poral dimensions of fugitivity to span flight and renewal.
Democratic Theory by the Light of Fugitivity
Taking democracy’s fugitive status seriously has implications not just for 
understanding what democracy is but also for the activity of theorizing 
about democracy – the how of democratic theory. No longer aiming for sta-
ble, settled, or secure objects, democratic theory must become nimbler, 
able to move between the high and the low like the landscape painter 
Machiavelli describes at the beginning of The Prince (Euben 2003: 105). Or, 
in the contemporary language of Robert Merton’s theory of the middle 
range (1968), democratic theory must attend to moments when the peo-
ple were able to do things – episodes of collective formation, power, and 
expression – while also elaborating broader claims as to what desires, 
virtues, habits, and memories could regenerate democratic moments. 
This approach to democratic theory has implications for its philosophical 
anthropology, how it reckons with its colonial past, its inherent tension 
as a project of establishing commonality amidst difference, and its dual 
commitments to theory and practice. Thus, four key research implica-
tions follow.
1. The democratic subject. Democratic theory must acknowledge that 
moments of the political often stem from a refusal of democratic sub-
jectivity rather than an embrace of it. Anarchists, communists, social-
ists, and other radicals abjure the language of democracy for a variety 
of reasons, yet despite their antidemocratic rhetoric, these movements 
often illuminate new pathways for democratic politics (cf. Gibson-Gra-
ham 2006 and Polleta 2004 on anarchism and anticapitalism; Aslam 2017 
and Malleson 2014 on Occupy). Coulthard’s language of refusal, for exam-
ple, challenges the structures and logics of the state in the name of col-
lective self-affirmation, a kind of democratic narcissism necessary in the 
face of de-democratizing institutions (Coulthard 2014). Misinterpellated 
subjects refuse conventional democratic subjectivity but prefigure eman-
cipated political subjects capable of self-rule (Martel 2018). While emerg-
ing from what Arendt would consider “social” claims, these movements 
can take political shape and, in turn, influence the political imaginations 
of the next generation of citizens and activists. From the perspective 
of democratic theory, they can unsettle sedimented assumptions about 
the means and meaning of democratic subjectivity. Unlike postfounda-
tional democratic theorists who might see fluid dispositions and unstable 
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subjectivities beneath these various movements (e.g., Crook 1991; Mar-
chart 2007; Mouffe 2000; White 2009; Wingenbach 2011), fugitive demo-
crats remain guided by a philosophical anthropology that maintains the 
importance of political experience for human life – that the human being 
is a zoon politikon – and look to moments when these experiences have 
been reinvigorated and regenerated.
2. The empire of democracy. Shadowed by its colonial and imperial his-
tory, democratic theory must confront how democracy has sanctioned 
and sponsored projects of domination and oppression since its inception. 
This has long been the history of democracy. Herodotus notes that at 
the moment of the ancient Athenians’ greatest democratic strength, they 
immediately invaded their neighbors (Herodotus 5.78). Democracy can 
function as an object of political aspiration, yet too often democracy has 
become a rallying cry for imperial and colonial projects. As noted above, 
democracy’s intertwinement with empire has led many potential allies 
of democrats to refuse the label and, thus, potential cooperation. While 
“freedom as marronage” rejects democratic politics, it also contains radi-
cal visions of alternative politics that might proceed on more democratic 
terms (cf. Kelley 2002). The language of #BlackLivesMatter provides an-
other example, with its insistence on bodily autonomy becoming a first 
step in any project of political reparation (Carruthers 2019; Lebron 2017; 
Taylor 2016). Democratic theory needs to reckon with how an insistence 
on a certain form of democracy (i.e., modern constitutional state-cen-
tered democracy) forecloses broader solidarity as well as theorization of 
democratic futures. Democratic theory needs to acknowledge the misuse 
of democracy, both past and present, in order for democracy to be more 
available and desirable as a project worth undertaking.
3. The heterogeneity of peoples. Democracy begins from a claim about 
the people; the people exercise power and a capacity to do things in a 
democratic regime. Taking the fugitivity of democracy seriously requires 
democratic theorists to acknowledge not just the exclusions every con-
cept of “the people” entails (a well-worn path of criticism) but also to 
affirm the possibility of unity within difference. In other words, demo-
cratic theorists have too often operated under a Rousseauian fantasy of 
what Benjamin Barber (1984) calls “strong democracy.” This has opened 
democratic theory to justifiable criticisms about the overlooked exclu-
sions of democratic formations (e.g., Beltran 2010; Young 2002). Fugitive 
democracy, however, begins with the sobering reality: the weakness of de-
mocracy and, in Wendy Brown’s language, the “undoing” of the demos 
(Brown 2015). With this starting point, democratic theory must shift ac-
cordingly: theorists can no longer presume a “people” but must instead 
examine how heterogeneous peoples can find projects of solidarity that 
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temporarily suspend normal heterogeneity and dissociation (cf. Wolin 
1993). In the language of Robert Putnam, democratic theory must attend 
to how peoples “bridge” as well as “bond” (2001; cf. Warren 2001). In an 
era when democracy is once again under direct siege, bridges among the 
islands of freedom, although rare and ephemeral, are the crucial sub-
stance of democratic life (Boyte 2004; Connolly 2008).
4. Experimental theory and practice. Fugitive democracy also requires a 
shift toward more experimental modes of theorizing as well as inhab-
iting and constructing institutional spaces. Without a vibrant object of 
study, democratic theorists find themselves bound to intervene (Coles 
2016). Like anthropologists watching the extinction of an indigenous lan-
guage, democratic theorists need to act lest democracy as an aspirational 
ideal recede from the face of the earth. Rather than describing the ge-
neric difficulties of democracy, theorizing outside the fray like a detached 
philosopher, democratic theorists must identify the particular moments 
of democratic flourishing past and amplify these to encourage stronger 
and more robust democratic experimentation in the present. On the one 
hand, fugitive democracy might begin with “phronetic” approaches that 
marry focused empirical study with theoretical reflection (Flyvbjerg 1998, 
2001) or participant action research from within insurgent groups (Dy-
rness 2011) but push these farther by elaborating and generalizing the 
democratic possibilities latent within these projects. On the other hand, 
fugitive democrats might also constellate otherwise isolated moments of 
democratic insurgency, such as plebeian uprisings (Breaugh 2014; Grat-
tan 2016), innovative democratic practices like participatory budgeting 
(Wright 2010), the solidarity of immigrant workers (Apostolidis 2010), and 
broad-based coalitions seeking to empower all participants (Bretherton 
2015; Stout 2010). Experimental theorizing operates best in a reciprocal 
dynamic with institutional experimentation – both the reworking of ex-
tant institutions and the creation of new ones – that integrates empirical 
and theoretical research on democratic life.
Conclusion
The adoption of “fugitivity” as a starting point for democratic theory can 
reinvigorate democratic aspirations in an increasingly undemocratic age. 
While Wolin’s concept of fugitive democracy has been criticized for sacri-
ficing too much of what makes democracy work – such as representative 
institutions or constitutional checks and balances – fugitivity can provide 
a more realistic and critical perspective on those assumed prerequisites 
(Vick 2015). Whether institutions serve democratization or threaten it is 
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clarified by a fugitive approach to democracy because such an approach 
takes seriously the idea that institutions should serve to reinforce popular 
power rather than to attenuate or weaken this power – something they 
rarely, if ever, actually do. By taking the nuances and edges of fugitivity se-
riously, democratic theorists are better positioned to see democracy as less 
of a known or settled object and more as a recurrent aspiration that has 
been – nearly perpetually – on the run. Doing so can clarify democratic ide-
als and hopes while simultaneously providing witness to the internal and 
external obstacles to the realization of these hopes. To follow this trajec-
tory, democratic theorists will need to sacrifice certain habits of “systems 
building,” but in doing so the vocation of democratic theory can reconnect 
to one of the original meanings of theoria as a form of traveling (Coles 2004; 
Euben 2008). Theorists who follow the uneven and treacherous pathways 
of fugitive democratic moments can track the losses and defeats to which 
democratic power is always vulnerable while simultaneously speaking to 
stubborn possibilities for democratic regeneration (McIvor 2016a).
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